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Abstract
There is a group effect on matching behavior; ingroups tend to be matched more
than outgroups. Differences in attention to ingroup and outgroup members may
correspond with group differences in matching. Determining how both attention and
matching are influenced by minimal groups can help distinguish between potential
mechanisms used to explain group effects in social behavior. Furthermore, it would be
beneficial to know if attention biases can be trained to social groups. Study 1 replicated
attention training to neutral faces, but study 2 failed to replicate attention training to
emotional faces. Study 3 used the same attention training method, but failed to train
attention to minimal groups. Study 4 measured attention and mimicry to minimal groups
and concluded that they follow the same pattern. Mimicry of ingroup happiness
expressions was observed, but incongruent frowning reactions to outgroup happiness
expressions were observed. No clear overall attention bias to minimal groups was
observed, but individuals with an ingroup attention bias smile to ingroup happy
expressions, while individuals with an outgroup attention bias frown to outgroup happy
expressions. Future studies should determine if attention might play a causal role in the
group effect on mimicry. Future research should also search for other methods of
overcoming the potentially deleterious effects of being in the outgroup.
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Introduction
People tend to match the behaviors of others; including movements, posture,
speech mannerisms, and facial expressions (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Dimberg, 1982;
Hess, Blairy, & Philippot, 1999). Previous research suggests that matching serves a
number of social purposes, including emotion contagion, creating rapport, facilitating
social interactions, and increasing prosocial behavior (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson,
1992; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng & Chartrand, 2003, van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, &
Knippenberg, 2004). Matching behavior occurs even when there is no explicit affiliation
goal – people match as a default (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). However, there is a group
effect on this matching; in general, ingroup members are matched more than outgroup
members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers,
2008; Seibt et al., 2013). Despite this evidence that group membership matters for
matching, little work has identified processes that might correspond with this group effect
on matching. Since matching behavior is related to important social processes, it is
important to identify processes for future research to investigate as candidate mechanisms
for the group effect on matching.
A leading theory identifies general affiliation goals as one possible mechanism for
the group effect on matching (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Hess & Fischer, 2013).
According to this affiliation model, people typically have a higher desire to affiliate with
positive others (presumably, the ingroup) versus negative others (presumably, the
1

outgroup). However, another explanation is that differences in attention to ingroup and
outgroup members may correspond to group differences in matching. In support of this,
there is also a group effect on attention, such that ingroup and outgroup members are
attended to differentially (e.g. Bean et al., 2012; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Richeson &
Trawalter, 2008). While some studies have examined how attention and matching
behavior might be associated with one another, few studies have measured attention and
mimicry at the same time. Furthermore, no studies have examined if both matching and
attention to in- and out-group members follows the same pattern within the same study.
Determining if attention and matching follow the same pattern is the first step to
determining if attention is a mechanism that contributes to the group effect on matching.
Studies of matching and attention in different groups have tended to focus on
more complex groups where a number of different factors could contribute to the group
effect. In these studies, group membership has been confounded with stereotypes,
negative attitudes, competition for resources, familiarity, threat-value, and similarity. One
way to reduce the number of candidate processes that might drive these differences is to
study minimal groups, which conservatively manipulate mere identification with one
group over another. In minimal group paradigms, people are assigned to minimal groups
under the cover of arbitrary group differences, such as a preference for abstract art or dot
estimation abilities; however they are in fact randomly assigned (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel,
Billing, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Categorizing individuals into minimal groups has a
significant influence on intergroup perception, evaluation, and other behaviors (e.g.
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Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001; Otten & Wentura, 1999; Van Bavel &
Cunningham, 2009, 2011).
However, little is known about how attention and matching function in these
minimal groups, and especially whether attention and matching will follow the same
pattern to minimal groups. There are three possible models of how differences in
attention and matching to minimal groups may manifest. Identifying which model is
consistent with the results will allow me to distinguish between mechanisms used to
explain both attention and mimicry results.
Mechanisms used to explain the group effect on mimicry include two tenets of the
affiliation model: pre-existing rapport and a goal to affiliate. The pre-existing rapport
mechanism maintains that people have a motivation to affiliate with individuals with
whom they already have a positive relationship, such as friends or ingroup members
(Hess & Fischer, 2013). The goal to affiliate mechanism maintains that people are
motivated to affiliate with individuals with whom they currently do not have a
relationship, such as strangers or some outgroup members (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). A
final possibility is that attentional differences between groups capture different
mechanisms used to explain group attention effects, such as the threat-value of the
outgroup, the novelty of the outgroup, and the motivational relevance of the ingroup.
Measures of both attention and matching are necessary to distinguish between
three possible models governing intergroup behavior. First, the pre-existing rapport
model predicts that both attention and mimicry will be increased to the ingroup. Second,
the goal to affiliate model predicts that both attention and mimicry will be increased to
3

the outgroup. Third, the threat model predicts that attention will be increased to the
outgroup, but mimicry will be increased to the ingroup. There is strong evidence for early
attention to the outgroup that is usually explained by the greater threat-value of the
outgroup. If the pattern of results follows the goal to affiliate model of increased attention
and mimicry to the outgroup, then this calls into question the threat mechanism
explanation of group attention biases. Instead, greater attention to the outgroup could be
due to motivations to affiliate. However, if the pattern of results follows the threat model
(increased attention to the outgroup that is NOT associated with increased mimicry), then
it seems unlikely that attention could play a role in group differences in matching
behavior.
In addition, the present studies tested whether attention to minimal groups could
be manipulated with a computerized training. If attention and matching show similar
patterns, and attention can be manipulated to minimal groups, future studies might test
the causal role attention may have on matching by attempting to manipulate attention to
minimal groups and then measure matching.
Finally, in reviewing the literature on matching of groups, I will cover behavioral
matching (copying non-emotional motor movements, such as face touching) and
synchrony (moving together at the same rate) in addition to facial emotional mimicry.
While these behaviors are likely not the same (see Hess & Fischer, 2013), the group
effect is remarkably consistent across them. I use matching as a broader term to cover
behavioral matching, synchrony, and facial emotional mimicry. I use mimicry to
specifically cover facial emotional mimicry.
4

The Role of Affiliation in Matching
Researchers reviewing the recent matching literature propose that a general
affiliation desire is a key mechanism of mimicry behavior; matching increases as
affiliation desires increase (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Hess & Fischer, 2013). Consistent
with this model, there is evidence that pre-existing rapport is influential in matching. Preexisting rapport is often operationalized as an attitude toward a target, such as when
participants are manipulated to like or dislike targets. Participants show increased
movement synchrony (Miles, Griffiths, Richardson, & Macrae, 2010) and behavioral
matching (Stel et al., 2010) with a liked compared to a disliked target. Participants also
demonstrate greater emotional mimicry to a liked confederate (McIntosh, 2006), liked
avatar (Likowski et al., 2008) or liked politician (McHugo, Lanzetta, & Bush, 1991)
compared to disliked others. For emotional mimicry, there seems to be an elevation of
mimicked smiles for liked individuals, a reduction of mimicked sad expressions to
disliked individuals, while anger expressions are not mimicked differentially. These
studies demonstrate that when participants like an individual they will match that
individual more than a neutral or disliked individual, while neutral and disliked
individuals are mimicked to the same extent (except for sad expressions) (Miles et al.,
2010; Stel et al., 2010, study 1). However, none of these studies addresses whether
attention and matching behavior follow the same pattern to liked or disliked individuals.
It is possible that individuals simply pay more attention to liked individuals, with a
corresponding increase in matching behavior.
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There is also evidence that a goal to affiliate is influential in matching. Giving
participants either a conscious or unconscious affiliation goal increases behavioral
matching (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003, study 1). When participants are unable to fulfill an
affiliation goal due to the unfriendliness of a confederate, they show increased levels of
behavioral matching with a subsequent interaction partner (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003,
study 2). Those who have recently experienced social exclusion or are primed with social
exclusion are especially motivated to affiliate through increased behavioral matching of a
later interaction partner (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2009).
These studies demonstrate that having a goal to affiliate with others increases matching
behavior. However, none of these studies addresses whether attention and matching
follow the same pattern, especially to those from different groups. It may be that a goal to
affiliate may simultaneously increase attention and matching to the affiliation target.
Mechanisms of Attention Bias to Groups
It is important to better understand the mechanisms responsible for attention
biases to social groups, as attention biases to groups have important real-world outcomes
(e.g. shooter bias – decision to shoot a potentially hostile target; Correll, Park, Judd, &
Wittenbrink, 2002). Research on attention biases to groups has generally found greater
early attention to outgroups, and greater later attention to ingroups.
The threat mechanism hypothesizes that attention may be biased because the
outgroup is perceived as more threatening. Emotional stimuli grab attention; emotion is
detected faster and is more distracting than neutral information (Vuilleumier & Brosch,
2009). Angry faces, in particular, seem especially likely to capture attention (Calvo,
6

Avero & Lundqvist, 2006). Therefore, social identities that are considered threatening
should capture attention. Specifically, outgroup members may be considered threatening,
especially those with threat-related stereotypes (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). The
threat mechanism explains the attention bias to outgroup faces as resulting from the
threat-value of these outgroup faces. Therefore, this mechanism would predict greater
attention to outgroup members, but only if they are perceived as threatening.
Alternatively, outgroup attention biases may result from the relative novelty of
outgroup faces. Novel stimuli tend to capture attention (Bradley, 2009). Outgroup,
especially racial outgroup, faces are generally more novel and less familiar than ingroup
faces and therefore may tend to capture attention irrespective of the threat value of the
faces. However, because minimal groups themselves are novel, it is unlikely that novelty
would drive attention biases to minimal groups. Therefore, this mechanism would predict
greater attention to any faces that are relatively more novel, usually outgroup faces.
Finally, ingroup attention biases may be driven by the greater motivational
relevance of the ingroup. Ingroup members are an important social resource with greater
psychological significance (Correll & Park, 2005). Ingroup members are more likely to
have an important impact on an ingroup member’s life, by allocating rewards and/or
punishments. Therefore, this mechanism would predict greater attention to ingroup faces
because of their greater motivational relevance. The research reviewed below reveals
evidence for each of these potential mechanisms used to explain group attention biases.
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Patterns of Attention and Matching
Behavioral matching, including facial mimicry, is proposed to occur through a
perception-action link, where the mere perception of an action by another increases the
likelihood that another person will perform the same action (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
The perception-action understanding of matching suggests that attention should follow
the same pattern as matching. As I review below, there is evidence that attention
allocation is different to ingroups versus outgroups; therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that attention could follow the same pattern as group differences in matching behavior.
However, there is limited research on how attention and matching are associated in
general; some research suggests that attention and matching behavior follow different
patterns, while other research suggests that attention and matching do follow the same
pattern.
Research that suggests no association between attention and matching comes from
the studies employing measures of memory and eye gaze fixation time. One study tested
memory for interaction partners as a measure of attention (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003).
The researchers found that participants’ memory for details of their interaction partners
was independent of their matching behavior. Additionally, two studies found that eye
gaze fixation time, as measured by eye tracking, does not predict the degree of facial
mimicry (Mojzisch et al., 2006; Schrammel, Pannasch, Graupner, Mojzisch, &
Velichkovsky, 2009). These studies provide some evidence that attention and matching
behavior may not follow the same pattern, however it is possible that memory and
fixation time are not the most direct and therefore not the best measures of attention.
8

In contrast, research utilizing event-related potential (ERP) components and task
instructions to direct attention suggest that attention and matching do follow the same
pattern. One study simultaneously recorded ERP components and facial mimicry and
found that the amplitude of an early visual evoked potential related to attentional
processes (right P1) and the degree of facial mimicry moved in the same direction
(Achaibou, Pourtois, Schwartz, & Vuilleumier, 2008). This indicates that when an ERP
component related to attention increases, mimicry also increases. Another study
demonstrates that instructed selective attention for non-emotional information suppresses
mimicry behavior (Cannon, Hayes, & Tipper, 2009). Researchers had participants
identify either the emotional expression or the color of a series of happy and angry faces
that were either blue or yellow. Facial mimicry was suppressed when focusing attention
on the color of the face as compared to the emotional expression. This suggests that
directing attention away from facial expression attributes suppresses mimicry behavior.
Overall, evidence on attention and matching is largely inconclusive. Behavioral
matching may not be related to memory of the interaction partner and facial mimicry may
not be related to face fixation time. However, there is evidence that facial mimicry may
be related to ERP components that index attention and that facial mimicry is influenced
by task instructions that change the focus of attention. Finally, none of these studies
measured whether attention and mimicry follow the same pattern to groups, specifically
minimal groups. As reviewed below, there is a plethora of research on the group effect on
both matching and attention, but most of it does not consider that how groups are formed
might matter.
9

Group Differences in Matching and Attention
Much of the research on matching and attention largely ignores the fact that
ingroups and outgroups can refer to several different types of groups. Below, I separated
research on matching and attention by the nature of the group distinction, into socially
consequential groups, interdependent groups, incidental groups, and minimal groups, and
covered attention and matching effects for each type of group. Specifically, there is
evidence that once group types are separated into these different categories, distinct
patterns of matching for specific emotional expressions (angry, happy, sad, and fear)
emerge.
Socially consequential groups. These are groups with histories of clear
differences in opportunities and social power (e.g., people of a different race, religion, or
political affiliation). Groups that are socially consequential are the most complex type of
group; they involve negative attitudes, stereotypes, differences in social power and often
competition with outgroups (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).
Matching of socially consequential groups. So far, the matching literature has
examined socially consequential groups that can be divided into differences by race,
ideology, and social power and found that generally ingroup members are matched more
than outgroup members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Carr, Winkielman, & Oveis, 2014; van
der Schalk et al., 2011; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & Peace, 2006). Race influences facial
mimicry; Caucasian participants show greater emotional mimicry of anger expressions of
Caucasian individuals compared to non-Caucasian individuals, but no differential
mimicry of smiles (van der Schalk et al., 2011, study 2).
10

Ideological differences, such as religion and political party affiliation, also
influence matching behavior. In New Zealand, where religious individuals are a relatively
disliked minority, individuals tend to show greater behavioral matching of non-religious
compared to religious individuals (Yabar et al., 2006). People also show greater
emotional mimicry of anger expressions to ingroup politicians compared to outgroup
politicians, but no differential mimicry of smiles (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008, study 1).
Finally, social power also influences emotional facial mimicry (Carr et al., 2014).
Participant power interacts with target power to influence the amount of mimicry to
angry or happy facial expressions. Participants mimic the anger expressions of the high
power target (e.g., senior executive) and not the low power target (e.g., fast food worker).
Importantly, low power participants smile to all targets (low and high power) and
expressions (happy and angry faces). Generally, mimicry in socially consequential
groups is enhanced to the ingroup – especially for the emotion of anger – while there
seems to be no differential mimicry of smiles. However, none of the studies have
measured attention in these group-driven matching differences. Consistent with the idea
that matching and attention may follow the same pattern, there is also evidence that
attention allocation differs between ingroup and outgroup for socially consequential
groups.
Attention to socially consequential groups. The literature on attention to socially
consequential groups has largely focused on the differences in attention allocated to
Black versus White individuals (by White individuals). Findings from this research
distinguish between early and late attentional biases. Research using event-related
11

potentials (ERP) finds that Black faces evoke larger early attentional components (N100
and P200) than White faces, indicating that greater early attention is directed to outgroup
faces (Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005). Conversely, later in the attentional stream (N200 or
P300), Whites’ attention appears to shift toward White targets and away from Black
targets.
Research using the dot-probe detection paradigm also finds that White
participants have biased attention toward Black faces (Trawalter, Todd, Baird, Richeson,
2008, study 1). White participants are faster to detect a dot presented behind faces of
Black compared to White men when the face is only presented for 30ms, indicating that
individuals direct early attention to Black men. Importantly, this attention bias disappears
when faces are presented with averted eye-gaze (Trawalter et al., 2008, study 2). Averted
eye-gaze may attenuate the threat signal communicated by Black faces and therefore
eliminate the attention bias to threat. Another study has shown that when White
participants are induced to think about crime, Black faces are much more likely to
capture attention (faces presented for 450ms) than individuals not induced to think about
crime (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004). Endorsement of danger stereotypes of
Black individuals predicts an increase in attention to Black (compared to White) faces
(presented for 40ms) for White participants (Donders, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2008). All
of these studies provide considerable support that this early attentional bias toward Black
targets for White individuals may indicate specific attention to threatening cues as Black
individuals are commonly associated with a threat stereotype.

12

Furthermore, attentional bias toward outgroup members is also moderated the
motivation to respond without prejudice to Black individuals (Bean et al., 2012; Richeson
& Trawalter, 2008). Individuals with high external motivation (EM) to respond without
prejudice show a greater attention bias to Black faces (compared to White faces) at brief
presentation times (35ms), but at longer presentations (450ms) this bias reverses to favor
White rather than Black faces. However, individuals with low EM to respond without
prejudice do not show either of these attentional biases. This study, which used the dotprobe to measure attention, is corroborated by eye-tracking research demonstrating that
high-EM participants exhibit the same early-late, vigilance-avoidance pattern of attention
(Bean et al., 2012). In this study participants with high EM may hold stronger threat
stereotypes about Black individuals than participants with low EM.
The studies above largely consider early attention to outgroups as reflecting the
outgroup’s threat value. In contrast, other studies provide evidence that an attentional bias
to racial outgroup members may not be that simple. Similar to the ERP studies above,
researchers found that Black targets elicit enhanced P200 amplitudes (reflecting early
attention) and White targets elicit enhanced N200 (reflecting late attention) for White
participants (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007). In contrast, the opposite pattern is observed for
Black participants. This suggests that attentional differences may not be due merely to the
threat stereotype of Black males, but could reflect the novelty of outgroup faces and/or
the motivational relevance of the ingroup. It is also possible that Black individuals find
White faces threatening and so it is not merely a threat stereotype that motivates early
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attention, but rather that outgroup faces may often be considered more threatening than
ingroup faces.
Other research supports the conclusion that attention biases result from novelty
instead of threat-value of the faces. White participants with fewer close other-race friends
(Blacks or Asians), demonstrate greater attentional bias toward outgroup faces (early, at
100ms). Conversely, the more racial outgroup friendships participants’ report, the less
attentional bias to outgroup faces they display (Dickter, Gagnon, Gyurovski &
Brewington, 2015). In this case, outgroup members may capture attention because of
their relative novelty and unfamiliarity to perceivers. Furthermore, another study found
that East Asian female faces selectively capture attention compared to White female faces
for White participants at presentation times of 100ms and 500ms (Al-Janabi, MacLeod, &
Rhodes, 2012). Greater attention to outgroup faces may not be simply be due to threat
detection, as East Asian female faces were not rated as more threatening than White
female faces. Again, attention to non-threatening outgroups may reflect the relative
novelty of outgroup faces compared to ingroup faces.
In conclusion, research on natural attention allocation to racial groups generally
suggests that early attention is directed toward racial outgroup members and later
attention is directed toward racial ingroup members. There is considerable evidence that
threat detection may play a role in this initial attention bias to Black targets. However,
there is also evidence that novelty of the outgroup may play a role. Finally, there is some
evidence that motivational relevance could be responsible for a late ingroup attention
bias. Research examining group effects must carefully control for, or eliminate, the
14

effects of novelty and/or threat-value and determine if group attention biases still exist.
To most clearly test for group effects, in- and out- groups should be perceived as equally
threatening and novel. For example, using minimal groups that lack threat stereotypes
and where the outgroup is not any less familiar than the ingroup, is one way to clarify
these group attention biases. If an attention bias exists within minimal groups, then it
cannot be due to novelty and is unlikely due to threat and therefore may suggest that a
different mechanism is operating, such as motivational relevance.
Overall, mimicry research finds ingroup members are mimicked more than
outgroup members, while attention research finds that early attention is directed toward
outgroup members and later attention is directed toward ingroup members. Overall,
mimicry findings could be consistent either with the affiliation model or late attention
allocation, but they are not consistent with the observed patterns of early attention
allocation. In general, mimicry research on socially consequential groups measures
mimicry over several seconds, so it seems consistent that mimicry effects match findings
for later attention. Also, as mimicry usually occurs after 500ms (Dimberg & Thunberg,
1998), it is logical that mimicry may always track with later attentional processes.
Interdependent groups. Interdependent groups are groups that are cooperating or
competing to obtain resources. Therefore, there are ramifications to the relationship; an
ingroup emotion has signal value for the outgroup in terms of a gain or a loss (Sherif,
Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Deutsch, 1949; Fiske & Ruscher, 1993). By
creating groups in the laboratory, the influence of stereotypes, familiarity, or a history of
social conflict should not impact reactions to interdependent groups.
15

Matching of interdependent groups. A number of studies have examined the
influence of competition on emotional mimicry. Specific patterns are hard to discern
because different comparisons have been made across studies (e.g. many studies include
only two of the three groups of competitor, neutral and cooperative other). A consistent
observation is that findings appear affected by the expression being studied. People show
greater mimicry of happy and sad expressions of cooperative others compared to
competitive others (Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2011; Seibt et al.,
2013; Weyers, Mühlberger, Kund, Hess, & Pauli, 2009). Reactions to competitive others
show evidence for reduced mimicry compared to neutral others in response to happy and
sad expressions (Likowski et al., 2011). However, people also tend not to mimic the
angry expressions of neutral or cooperative others either (Likowski et al., 2011; Seibt et
al., 2013; Weyers et al., 2009), and suppress the corrugator muscle in response to angry
expressions of competitive others (Likowski et al., 2011; Seibt et al., 2013). Suppression
of the corrugator in response to angry faces is an incongruent emotional reaction that
could indicate a Schadenfreude reaction (i.e. mild positive affect in response to angry
responses of the competitive other).
Across studies, two common findings emerge. First, mimicry of competitive
others is suppressed compared to neutral or cooperative others. Second, mimicry differs
by expression – happy and sad expressions are enhanced for cooperative others and
suppressed for competitors, while angry faces are not mimicked at all. This effect of
expressions is different from that found in socially consequential groups, where happy
expressions are not differentially mimicked. To my knowledge, there are no studies
16

examining attention allocation to interdependent groups. Therefore, it is unknown
whether attention allocation would parallel the findings of mimicry behavior.
Incidental groups. These groups are conceptualized as minimal groups, but they
are based on actual pre-existing social identities, such as hobbies, activities, or academic
interests. Incidental groups do not have clear and consistent histories of unequal
opportunities in the social structure, as in socially-consequential groups. However,
because these identities often have social consequences and sometimes a degree of
familiarity, there is likely more meaningful identification with group characteristics than
occurs when minimal groups are created entirely arbitrarily in the laboratory.
Matching of incidental groups. A number of studies have examined the influence
of incidental groups on matching behavior. High self-monitoring undergraduate students
match ingroup undergraduate students more than outgroup high school or graduate
students (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003). Individuals also match others who share the same
name more than those who do not share the same name (Gueguen & Martin, 2009, study
1). Additionally, individuals show significantly more behavioral matching (Gueguen &
Martin, 2009, study 2) and emotional mimicry of fear and anger expressions (but not
happy expressions) for same college major versus different college major (van der Schalk
et al., 2011, study 1). Finally, people who like basketball mimic the sad expressions of
basketball players more than individuals who do not like basketball (Bourgeois & Hess,
2008, study 2). However, happy expressions are not mimicked differentially between
groups, and anger expressions are not mimicked at all.
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Overall, incidental ingroup members are matched more than incidental outgroup
members. For incidental groups there are different effects for sad, angry and happy
expressions. Smiles seem to be positive enough stimuli that they are able to overpower
incidental group differences and therefore ingroup and outgroup smiles are matched to
the same extent (see Hess & Fischer, 2013). In contrast, fear, sadness, and sometimes
anger do not seem to have this effect, so ingroup members are matched more than
outgroup members. These findings are consistent with socially consequential groups,
where smiles are not differentially mimicked, but anger is. However, these findings
contrast with interdependent groups, where mimicry of happy and sad expressions is
enhanced for cooperative others and the emotional expressions of competitive others are
not mimicked at all.
Attention to incidental groups. To my knowledge, there is only one study
examining attention allocation to incidental groups (Brosch & Van Bavel, 2012). In this
study, participants were told they were looking at either students belonging to their own
university (ingroup) or to a different university (outgroup). Using the dot probe paradigm,
researchers found faster reaction times to outgroup faces when the faces were presented
for 100ms. This attention allocation finding is consistent with the early attention bias
toward outgroups observed in socially consequential groups. However, at a longer
presentation time, 500ms, researchers also found greater attention to unfamiliar outgroup
faces. This fits with the novelty mechanism, but is in contrast to the majority of findings
for a later attention bias to racial ingroup members (however these studies did not
introduce novel faces). Because these findings for attention to incidental groups are
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somewhat preliminary, using minimal groups should simplify and clarify the effect of
mere group categorization on attention processes.
Minimal groups. Minimal groups are created to study the social and
psychological effects of arbitrary categorization into different social groups (Billig &
Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Tajfel et al., 1971). This mere categorization creates a
sense of group membership without any accompanying knowledge about any one
particular group member. These ingroup-outgroup distinctions do not involve even mild
competition or conflict over scarce resources (Brewer, 1999). However, people still tend
to be more favorable, in terms of resource allocation, to members of their own group
even if there is no outgroup animosity (Brewer, 1979, 1993; Hewstone, 2002). Therefore,
the creation of minimal groups should result in ingroup favoritism, but no stereotypes,
negative attitudes, competition or familiarity with outgroup members.
Matching of minimal groups. Only one study has examined the impact of
minimal groups on matching behavior – specifically synchrony behavior. Participants
demonstrate more synchrony with a target that belongs to the minimal outgroup
compared to the minimal ingroup (Miles, Lumsden, Richardson, & Macrae, 2011). While
this is inconsistent with the pre-existing rapport mechanism, it is consistent with the
desire to affiliate mechanism. The authors argue that in this case synchrony may be used
as a means to reduce social distance with an outgroup member. In other words,
individuals use synchrony to diminish the minor interpersonal differences rather than
enhance the preexisting self-other similarities with the ingroup. In the absence of
stereotypes, negative attitudes, competition, or familiarity with outgroup members,
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people exhibit more synchrony with outgroup members, not less. However, it is unknown
if these findings replicate when examining emotional facial mimicry. This study suggests
that there might be greater emotional mimicry of outgroup than ingroup members, in
contrast to the previous research summarized on the group effect on mimicry.
Attention to minimal groups. In contrast to research on attention biases in other
groups, research on attention allocation to minimal groups generally suggests that
minimal ingroup members are attended to more than minimal outgroup members. For
example, members of minimal ingroups benefit from greater face memory (Bernstein,
Young, & Hugenberg, 2007), facial emotional expression identification (Young &
Hugenberg, 2010), face processing (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; Van Bavel, Packer, &
Cunningham, 2008), fusiform face area activation (Van Bavel, Packer & Cunningham,
2011), and mental representations of faces (Ratner, Dotsch, Wigboldus, van Knippenberg
& Amodio, 2014). All of these studies conclude that these processes are more favorable
for minimal ingroup members compared to minimal outgroup members.
Eye tracking and ERP studies provide further evidence that minimal ingroups
receive greater attention than minimal outgroups. When participants are presented with
both a minimal ingroup and outgroup face on a screen, eye-tracking measures indicate
that participants spend more time looking at ingroup than outgroup faces, and specifically
the eye region in comparison to the nose or mouth regions (Kawakami et al., 2014). An
ERP study found that minimal ingroup faces elicit larger ERP components reflecting face
processing (N170) than outgroup faces (Ratner & Amodio, 2013). Finally, one exception
to the above attentional findings identified appraisals of danger as a moderating factor.
20

More specifically, participants who rate minimal outgroup members as dangerous are
more likely to attend to outgroup males than ingroup males as measured by the dot probe
paradigm with presentation times of 500ms (Maner & Miller, 2013). This finding is
consistent with the threat mechanism of attention, while the other research for an ingroup
advantage is consistent with the motivational relevance of the ingroup.
Generally these studies indicate that minimal ingroup members seem to capture
greater attention than minimal outgroup members, with the one exception of minimal
outgroup members who are perceived as dangerous. It is unknown whether minimal
ingroups will be mimicked more than minimal outgroups. If mimicry follows that pattern,
it will be consistent with attention effects. While it seems plausible that attention and
matching may move in the same direction, it would be beneficial to examine the
influence of minimal groups on both attention and matching behavior within the same
study. Future studies could then determine if attention is a mechanism that could directly
influence mimicry. If so, then it opens up the possibility that attention could be changed
instead of changing someone’s affiliation motivation. Therefore, as another first step, it is
important to test if directly manipulating attention to social groups can actually change
group attention biases. In order to test for and train attention to minimal groups, an
experimental paradigm to measure and manipulate attention is needed.
Measuring and Manipulating Attention
To my knowledge, no studies to date have attempted to directly manipulate
attention to social groups. A single experimental paradigm – the dot-probe – has been
used to both measure and manipulate attention in anxiety and other contexts (Bar-Haim,
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Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van IJzendoorn, 2007; Bar-Haim, 2010;
MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, &
Holker, 2002). Studies measuring attention frequently assess attention to threatening
compared to neutral stimuli and report an attention bias towards threat that is associated
with anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; MacLeod et al., 1986). To measure the attention
bias, these studies briefly present a pair of words or faces, one threat-related and one
neutral. The removal of the word or face pair is followed by a small target probe that
appears in the location just occupied by one of the two stimuli. In the classic dot-probe
paradigm designed to measure attention, targets appear with equal probability behind
threat and neutral stimuli (MacLeod et al., 1986). Participants are required to respond to
the probe as quickly as possible. An attention bias is measured by determining response
latencies to the probes; faster responses are indicative of greater attention. Attention bias
toward threat is revealed when participants are faster to respond to probes that replace
threat-related stimuli compared to neutral stimuli (MacLeod et al., 1986). Eye tracking
studies also confirm that these response latencies are associated with differential gaze
toward threatening and non-threatening stimuli. Individuals with generalized anxiety
disorder are more likely to look first toward threat faces compared to neutral faces
(Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000) and individuals with social anxiety are quicker to look
at emotional compared to neutral faces (Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006).
Attention-training dot-probe studies manipulate probe location to systematically
appear behind the location of the stimulus type that attention is to be trained to. For
example, if the goal of the study is to train attention away from threat stimuli and toward
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neutral stimuli, the probe will appear more frequently behind the neutral stimulus,
therefore directing the individual’s attention to the neutral stimuli. A learned bias away
from threat is gradually induced over many trials. Therefore, the attentional focus of the
participant is changed and directed toward the neutral stimulus. Furthermore, participants
who have successfully undergone this attention training to avoid threat have reported
significant reductions in general anxiety (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009a; Hazen,
Vasey, & Schmidt, 2009) and social anxiety (Amir et al., 2009b; Amir, Weber, Beard,
Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). In other words,
dot-probe attention-training does effectively change attention. Specifically, one study
demonstrated that attention training modulates ERP components associated with
relatively late top-down cognitive processes of attention (reduces P2 and P3 and enhances
N2) for anxious individuals (Eldar & Bar-Haim, 2010). Eye tracking data also
demonstrates that participants trained to selectively attend to affectively positive (rather
than neutral) stimuli spend less time looking at negative images in a later task (Wadlinger
& Isaacowitz, 2008). This attention-training paradigm seems to be an effective method
for manipulating attention toward affective stimuli; however, it is unknown whether this
training can manipulate attention toward social aspects of stimuli, such as group
membership.
The Present Project
The overarching goal of this project was to study the influences of minimal group
membership on attention and mimicry. My first goal was to replicate attention training to
emotional faces and then determine if attention to minimal groups could be manipulated.
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Second, I wanted to determine if there is an attention bias to minimal groups. Third, I
wanted to determine if minimal ingroup members are mimicked more than minimal
outgroup members. Finally, I wanted to see if attention and mimicry effects on minimal
groups follow the same pattern. Studies 1 replicated previous work, demonstrating that
attention can be manipulated to neutral faces, while study 2 failed to replicate previous
work demonstrating that attention can be trained to emotional faces. Study 3 determined
if attention can be manipulated to minimal group members. Study 4 examined attention
and mimicry to minimal group members and determined if their effects on minimal
groups follow the same pattern.
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Study 1
Method
Participants. Twenty-two undergraduate students at the University of Denver
were recruited to participate in this study for extra credit in psychology classes. With an
N of 22 and given the power of .80, a power analysis informs that I could detect an effect
size as big as Cohen’s f = .31. Data was visually inspected for bivariate outliers and one
participant was removed. One participant was excluded for less than 93% accuracy on the
dot-probe trials during pre and post training (18.7% inaccurate trials). This cutoff is
similar to another attention training study (Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010).
Stimuli. Photos were selected from the NimStim face set (Tottenham et al.,
2009). A total of 12 individuals (six male, six female) were used, each displayed neutral
and angry expressions. Gender of face stimuli was matched to participant’s gender so that
each participant only saw six individuals total.
Procedure. Participants completed the entire procedure in a private room. The
experimenter helped to clarify instructions, but otherwise was not in the room with
participants. Participants completed the attention-training task (pre-training dot-probe,
attention training dot-probe, post-training dot-probe). Then they completed individual
difference measures on Qualtrics, an online survey tool. Before beginning the
experiment, participants consented to participate; all procedures were IRB approved.
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Attention training. To manipulate attention, participants completed a directed
dot-probe task. First, participants completed a pre-training dot-probe task to assess
natural, un-manipulated attention allocation to neutral and angry faces. Next, they
completed the attention-training dot-probe task to manipulate attention allocation toward
neutral faces. Finally, they completed the post-training dot-probe to assess that attention
was successfully manipulated.
Pre-training dot-probe. In this pre-training task, each attention trial began with a
crosshair fixation cue centered on the computer screen for 500ms followed by a pair of
pictures (a neutral face and an angry face) presented for 500ms, one picture appeared
right above the crosshair and one right below (following MacLeod et al., 2002). The
position of the neutral verses angry faces was randomized. Next, a small target (. or ..)
appeared with equal probability in either the upper or lower location of one of the faces
previously presented on the screen. The small target appeared roughly behind where the
eyes of the target face were. The participant’s task was to discriminate the target’s
identity (. or ..) as accurately and quickly as possible by pressing either the “1” or “2”
key. As soon as the computer detected a response, the target was cleared and the next trial
resumed in 500ms. There were 96 trials total. There was always one neutral face and one
angry face on the screen.
Dot-probe attention training. Next, participants completed the attention-training
dot-probe task. Participants completed the dot-probe task described above with one
change: 94.44% of the targets appeared behind the pictures of neutral faces (Wadlinger &
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Isaacowitz, 2008). There were a total 324 trials with 306 critical trials that trained
attention to neutral faces.
Post-training dot-probe. Next, participants completed a post-training dot-probe
task to ensure attention training was successful. This was exactly the same as the pretraining task, with targets appearing with equal likelihood (50%) behind neutral or angry
faces.
Analysis plan. For each study, first I investigated natural, pre-training attention
biases with pared samples t-tests. Second, for studies 1-3, I investigated effects of the
attention training manipulation with repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Third, I examined whether pre-training attention bias influenced effects of training. To
determine whether pre-training bias scores influenced training effects on post-training
attentional biases, I first constructed pre- and post-training attention bias scores by
subtracting the RT to emotion (outgroup) faces from the RT to neutral (ingroup) faces.
Thus, a positive attentional bias score reflects faster RTs to emotion (outgroup) versus
neutral (ingroup) faces and a negative score reflects faster RTs to neutral (ingroup) versus
emotion (outgroup) faces.
I used hierarchical regression analyses to examine continuous effects of pretraining attention biases on post-training attention bias. Post-training attention bias
always served as the dependent variable. For studies 2 and 3, to examine whether training
condition, pre-training attention biases, or the interaction between training condition and
pre-training attention bias moderated the effects of attention training on post-training
attention biases, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted. Training
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condition was dummy coded and entered in step one, pre-training attention bias was
entered in step two, and the training condition by pre-training bias interaction term was
entered in step three.
In studies 3 and 4, I explored the effectiveness of the minimal groups
manipulation. Participants’ ratings for the individuals were collapsed within the ingroup
or outgroup for each manipulation check question separately for each time point. Paired
samples t-tests were conducted to compare ratings on the subjective impression
composite, threat, and inclusion variables of individuals belonging to the ingroup versus
outgroup. When the subjective impression composite overall was not significant, any
effects of interest were provided in a footnote. Across all analyses, whenever higher order
2 or 3-way interactions were significant, analyses were broken down into appropriate 2way ANOVAs or t-tests. Whenever effects violated assumptions of sphericity,
greenhouse--geisser corrected values were reported.
Results
Reaction Time Data Reduction. Trials with incorrect responses were removed
(2.08%). Participant accuracy ranged from 93.25% to 100%. Trials with reaction times
(RTs) greater than 2000ms were also excluded from analyses (0.10% of trials with
correct responses). Trials with RTs 3 standard deviations (calculated separately for each
condition) above each participant’s mean were also excluded from analyses (1.57% of
remaining trials). Previous literature has used similar criteria to eliminate individual RT
trials (Brosch & van Bavel, 2012; Klumpp & Amir, 2010). RTs for the remaining trials
within each condition were averaged across trials.
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Pre-training (Untrained) Attention Bias. To test for an untrained attentional
bias to neutral versus angry faces pre-training, I conducted a two-tailed paired samples ttest comparing mean RT to neutral versus angry faces. This t-test revealed a significant
difference such that participants were faster to angry versus neutral faces, t(19) = -5.121 p
< .001. See Figure 1 for means. Therefore, before training participants demonstrated an
untrained attentional bias to angry faces.
Post-training Attention Bias. To test my central hypothesis that training
attention to neutral faces would decrease reaction times to neutral versus angry faces I
conducted a time (pre, post) by emotion (angry, neutral) analysis of variance (ANOVA).
There were no significant main effects (p’s > .665). There was a significant time by
emotion interaction, F(1, 19) = 29.695, p < .001. To break apart this interaction, follow
up t-tests indicated that after training to neutral faces, participants were faster to neutral
as compared to angry faces, t(19) = 5.319, p < .001. Figure 1 demonstrates that attention
training was successful because participants became faster to neutral faces at posttraining, reversing the angry attention bias observed at pre-training.
Post-training effects considering pre-training bias. A linear regression analysis
was conducted with pre-training attention bias serving as the predictor. A significant
regression equation was found, R2 = .692, F(1, 18) = 40.357, p < .001. Figure 2
demonstrates that the stronger the pre-training attention bias to angry faces, the more
effective training was, such that participants showed a stronger attention bias to neutral
faces at post-training. This indicates that the training is most effective on participants
with a strong pre-training bias in the opposite direction.
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Discussion
This study replicated previous research by successfully training attention to
neutral faces (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Amir et al., 2009b; Eldar & Bar-Haim, 2010;
Schmidt et al., 2009). The attention manipulation transformed the natural, pre-training
angry attention bias into a neutral attention bias post-training, which indicates that our
dot-probe training paradigm successfully manipulated attention. Considering pre-training
attention biases revealed that attention training to neutral faces was related to the degree
of pre-training anger attention bias. The individuals with the greatest pre-training
attention bias to angry faces, showed the greatest reversal of the attention bias through
training by demonstrating a greater neutral attention bias at post-training. Because
emotional faces differ from neutral faces in that they capture more attention and carry
more meaning (Vuilleumier & Brosch, 2009), I next wanted to determine if attention to
emotional faces could be trained successfully.
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Study 2
Method
Participants. Forty-one undergraduate students at the University of Denver were
recruited to participate in this study for extra credit in psychology classes. One participant
was excluded for less than 93% accuracy on the dot-probe trials during pre and post
training (33.85% inaccurate trials). Participants were either in the train to angry condition
(N = 21) or the train to happy condition (N = 19).
Stimuli. Photos were the same as study one, except that happy expressions were
used in addition to neutral and angry expressions.
Procedure. Participants completed the attention-training task (pre-training dotprobe, attention training dot-probe, post-training dot-probe). Then they completed
individual difference measures on Qualtrics.
Attention training. To manipulate attention, participants completed a directed
dot-probe task. First, participants completed a pre-training dot-probe task to assess unmanipulated attention allocation to neutral and angry faces or neutral and happy faces.
Next, they completed the attention-training dot-probe task to manipulate attention
allocation toward angry or happy faces. Finally, they completed the post-training dotprobe to assess if attention was successfully manipulated.
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Pre-training dot-probe. This was exactly the same as study 1, except that
individuals in the train to happy condition always saw one happy and one neutral face on
the screen and attention bias to happy versus neutral faces was measured.
Dot-probe attention training. This was exactly the same as study 1, except half of
the participants were trained to attend to angry faces and half were trained to attend to
happy faces.
Post-training dot-probe. This was exactly the same as the pre-training dot-probe
trials.
Results
Reaction Time Data Reduction. As in study 1, trials with incorrect responses
were removed (1.76%). Participant accuracy ranged from 94.8% to 100%. Trials with
RTs greater than 2000ms were also excluded from analyses (.066% of trials with correct
responses). Trials with RTs 3 standard deviations (calculated separately for each
condition) above each participant’s mean were also excluded from analyses (1.23% of
remaining trials). RTs for the remaining trials within each condition were averaged across
trials.
Pre-training (Untrained) Attention Bias. To test for an untrained attentional
bias to neutral versus emotional (angry/happy) faces pre-training, I conducted two-tailed
paired samples t-test comparing RT to neutral faces versus RT to angry or happy faces.
These t-tests revealed no significant effect; participants were on average not faster to any
particular type of face (p’s > .248). In contrast to study 1, participants did not hold an
untrained attention bias to neutral or angry or happy faces.
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Post-training Attention Bias. To test my central hypothesis that training
attention to emotional (angry/happy) faces would decrease reaction times to emotional
(angry/happy) versus neutral faces I conducted a time (pre, post) by emotion (neutral,
angry/happy) ANOVA. There was a main effect of time, indicating participants were
faster at detecting the probe during post-training as compared to pre-training, F(1, 40) =
30.036, p < .001. No other main effects or interactions were significant (p’s > .184).There
were no effects of training condition (train to angry/happy), so these analyses are not
reported. In contrast to study 1, attention training does not appear to be successful.
Post-training effects considering pre-training bias. A hierarchical multiple
regression analysis was conducted as outlined in the analysis plan. The step one model,
training condition, was not significant, R2 = .020, F(1, 38) = .786, p = .381. The addition
of the pre-training attention bias variable at step two also did not account for a significant
proportion of variance, ΔR2 = .022, ΔF(1, 37) = .055, p = .815, nor did the interaction
term of condition by pre-train attention bias at step three, ΔR2 = .038, ΔF(1, 36) = .627, p
= .434. Training attention to emotional faces was not successful and considering pretraining bias did not reveal training effects on post-training attention bias scores.
Discussion
This study did not replicate previous research that has successfully trained
attention to angry (Eldar, Rincon, & Bar-Haim, 2008) or happy faces (Browning,
Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012; Li, Tan, Qian, & Liu, 2008; Heeren, Reese,
McNally, & Philippot, 2012). Training attention to emotional faces was not successful
and unlike study 1, considering pre-training attention biases did not show that training
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attention was only successful for those individuals who held the opposite attention bias at
pre-training (e.g. a neutral attention bias). It is unclear why training attention to emotional
faces did not successfully replicate previous findings. It may be that it is more difficult to
train attention to emotional than neutral faces. Next, I wanted to determine if it is possible
to manipulate attention to minimal group members.
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Study 3
Method
Participants. Forty-two undergraduate students at the University of Denver were
recruited to participate in this study for extra credit in psychology classes. Data from nine
participants were excluded; one participant incorrectly reported their own group
membership, an additional five participants incorrectly reported the group membership of
other individuals, and another three participants had less than 93% accuracy on the dotprobe trials across pre and post-training. Participants were either in the train to ingroup
condition (N = 19) or the train to outgroup condition (N = 14).
Design. The design consisted of one between-subjects factor and two withinsubject factors. Attention training toward group-type (ingroup or outgroup) occurred
between groups. The within subject factors were time (pre, post) and group membership
(ingroup vs. outgroup faces).
Stimuli. The face stimuli were the same as in study 2.
Procedure. Participants first completed the minimal groups manipulation to be
assigned to a minimal group. Next, they learned about the group membership of the
individuals they viewed throughout the study. Then they completed the first round of
manipulation check questions on Qualtrics. Next, they completed the attention-training
task (pre-training dot-probe, attention training dot-probe, post-training dot-probe).
Finally, they completed the second round of manipulation check questions, other
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individual difference measures, and rated the believability of the manipulation on
Qualtrics.
Minimal groups manipulation. To manipulate minimal groups, an established
“numerical estimation style” minimal group procedure was used to assign participants to
arbitrary, but believable groups (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971, Ratner & Amodio,
2013; Ratner et al., 2014). Participants were led to believe that people vary in numerical
estimation style, defined as the tendency to overestimate or underestimate the number of
objects they encounter. Participants were told that half the population are overestimators
and half are underestimators.
Participants were shown a series of ten dot patterns presented sequentially on a
computer screen for five seconds each. Each pattern of dots included 98-200 black dots
arranged randomly on a white background (see Ratner & Amodio, 2013). Following each
image, participants were prompted to estimate the number of dots presented. Upon
completion, the computer ostensibly analyzed their responses and presented predetermined feedback regarding their numerical estimation style. Feedback was
randomized across participants.
Group membership learning paradigm. Participants were then presented with the
six gender-matched neutral faces one at a time and asked to guess whether the individual
was an underestimator or overestimator. Three faces were labeled as underestimators and
three were labeled as overestimators; these estimation styles correspond to ingroup or
outgroup membership depending on the participant’s own estimation style. The six faces
were presented for three trials followed by five test trials until the participant correctly
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identified group membership of the individuals 80% of the time. Then the participants
were required to achieve 100% accuracy in identifying the group membership of the
individuals before they could move on with the experiment. This learning paradigm was
used to ensure that participants learned the group memberships of the individuals (Potts
& Shanks, 2014). Faces were randomly assigned numerical estimation style and
assignment was fully counterbalanced so no perceptual cues allowed participants to
visually sort the faces into groups. This design ensured that participants were equally
likely to see each face as an ingroup or outgroup member.
Attention training. To manipulate attention, participants completed a directed
dot-probe task. First, participants completed a pre-training dot-probe task to assess unmanipulated attention allocation to ingroup and outgroup members. Next, they completed
the attention-training dot-probe task to manipulate attention allocation. Finally, they
completed the post-training dot-probe to assess if attention was successfully manipulated.
Pre-training dot-probe. The overall dot-probe is the same as in Study 1. However,
instead of presenting a neutral and angry face simultaneously, one ingroup face and one
outgroup face were presented on the screen. The position of the ingroup verses outgroup
member’s faces was randomized. Dot-probe trials occurred with all emotional
expressions (angry, happy, neutral). Importantly, emotional expression was always
matched for the ingroup/outgroup pair displayed on each trial. There were 108 trials total.
Dot-probe attention training. Next, participants were split into two groups (train
ingroup or train outgroup) to complete the attention-training dot-probe task. The trainingroup group was exposed to the training condition designed to induce selective
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attention toward ingroup members. They completed the dot-probe task described above
with one change: 94.44% of the targets appeared behind pictures of ingroup members.
The train-outgroup was exposed to the training condition designed to induce selective
attention toward outgroup members, with 94.44% of the targets behind pictures of
outgroup members. There were a total 324 trials with 306 critical trials that trained
attention to the respective group members.
Post-training dot-probe. Next, participants completed a post-training dot probe
task to ensure attention training was successful. This was exactly the same as the pretraining task, with targets appearing with equal likelihood (50%) behind ingroup or
outgroup members.
Measures
Minimal group rating questions. Participants were asked to rate the likeability,
friendliness, desire to spend time with, trustworthiness, threat, and similarity to the
individuals presented in the study. Questions were answered on a seven-point scale from
one (not at all) to seven (very much). Questions to assess the subjective impression of the
individuals included: “How much do you like this person?,” “How friendly do you think
this person is?,” “How much time would you want to spend time with this person in the
future?”, and “How trustworthy do you think this person is?”. Threat was assessed with
the question: “How threatening do you thing this person is?”. Finally, similarity was
assessed using the Inclusion-of Other-in-Self scale (IOS) (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992).
These questions were administered after learning about the group membership of the
different individuals in the study and after the attention training trials.
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Results
Minimal Groups Manipulation Check. A subjective impression composite
variable was created combining the liking, friendliness, desire to spend time with and
trust ratings for time 1 (ingroup α = .855, outgroup α = .868) and time 2 (ingroup α =
.952, outgroup α = .943). To explore the influence of the minimal groups manipulation, ttests were conducted to compare ratings of individuals belonging to the ingroup versus
outgroup. At time 1 (immediately after learning about the groups, before attention
training), participants rated the outgroup as more threatening than the ingroup, t(32) =
2.779, p = .009 and reported feeling closer (on the IOS scale) to the ingroup compared to
the outgroup, t(32) = 2.080, p = .046. There was not a significant effect of the subjective
impression composite1. At time 2 (after attention training) there were no significant
effects for any of the ratings (p’s > .121).
Reaction Time Data Reduction. Trials with incorrect responses were removed
(1.85%). Participant accuracy ranged from 93.55% to 100%. Trials with RTs greater than
2000ms were also excluded from analyses (0.23% of trials with correct responses). Trials
with RTs 3 standard deviations (calculated separately for each condition) above each
participant’s mean were also excluded from analyses (1.33% of remaining trials).
Pre-training (Untrained) Attention Bias. To test for an untrained attentional
bias to minimal ingroup versus outgroup members for the different emotional expressions

Because the composite variable was not significant, I investigated the individual
variables. There was a marginal effect of participants reporting the ingroup to be
friendlier than the outgroup, (t(32) = -1.773, p= .086. There were no significant
differences between ingroup and outgroup individuals for ratings of liking, desire to
spend time with or trust (p’s > .357).
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of angry, happy or neutral, I conducted a group (ingroup, outgroup) by emotion (angry,
happy, neutral) ANOVA. There was a main effect of emotion, F(1.431, 45.797) = 3.808,
p = .043. To break down this main effect, follow-up t-tests indicate that participants were
faster to anger compared to happy faces, t(32) = -2.675, p = .012. No other differences
between emotions were significant (p’s > .155). No other main effects or interactions
were significant (p’s > .128). In the interest of fully exploring the data, this analysis was
followed up by separating the trials by emotion expression. See Figure 3 for means.
For angry expressions, a two-tailed paired samples t-test compared RT to angry
ingroup versus angry outgroup faces. This t-test was not significant, t(32) = -1.426, p =
.164.
For happy expressions, a two-tailed paired samples t-test compared RT to happy
ingroup versus happy outgroup faces. This t-test was also not significant, t(32) = 1.019, p
= .316.
For neutral expressions, a two-tailed paired samples t-test compared RT to neutral
ingroup versus neutral outgroup faces. This t-test revealed a marginally significant effect
such that participants were faster to neutral ingroup compared to outgroup faces, t(32) = 2.130, p = .053. There is no evidence for attention biases to ingroup versus outgroup
faces for angry or happy expressions; however there is evidence for an ingroup attention
bias for neutral expressions.
Post-training Attention Bias. To test my central hypothesis that attention
training would decrease reaction times to the trained group, I ran a time (pre, post) by
group membership (ingroup faces vs. outgroup faces) by training condition (train
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ingroup, train outgroup) ANOVA. There was a marginal time by group by training
condition 3-way interaction, F(1, 31) = 3. 179, p = .084. No other main effects or
interactions were significant (p’s > .108). In the interest of fully exploring the data, I
conducted time by group ANOVAS separately for each training condition to assess if
training to the ingroup reduced RTs to ingroup faces and if training to the outgroup
reduced RTs to outgroup faces. See Figure 4 for effects of each training condition.
For the train to ingroup condition there was a marginal main effect of time, F(1,
18) = 4.244, p = .054, indicating that participants were marginally faster at post versus
pre-training. There was also a marginal time by group interaction, F(1, 18) = 2.947, p =
.103. Follow-up t-tests show that participants became marginally faster to outgroup faces
from pre to post-training, t(18) = 2.224, p = .039. No other follow-up comparisons were
significant. No other main effects or interactions were significant (p’s > .706).
Participants trained to the ingroup actually became marginally faster to the outgroup at
post-training.
For the train to outgroup condition there was a marginal main effect of group,
F(1, 18) = 3.514, p = .084, revealing that participants were marginally faster to the
ingroup compared to outgroup. No other main effects or interactions were significant (p’s
> .403). Neither training attention to the ingroup nor outgroup reduced RT to the
appropriate group.
Post-training effects considering pre-training bias. A hierarchical multiple
regression analysis was conducted as outlined in the analysis plan. The step one model
was significant, R2 = .135, F(1, 31) = 4.836, p = .035, indicating training condition was
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related to post-training bias. However, this was in the opposite direction as predicted,
such that that individuals in the train to ingroup condition held an attention bias to
outgroup faces post training. Furthermore, the addition of the pre-training attention bias
variable at step two did not account for a significant proportion of variance, ΔR2 = .000,
ΔF(1, 30) = .013, p = .911, nor did the interaction term of condition by pre-train attention
bias at step three, ΔR2 = .003, ΔF(1, 29) = .113, p = .739. Unlike the results we report for
Study 1, effects of training did not depend on the degree of pre-training attention bias to
either the ingroup or the outgroup.
Discussion
This study failed to successfully train attention to minimal ingroup or outgroup
members. Participants’ RTs did not decrease from pre- to post-training for their trained
group. In fact, in the train to ingroup condition, participants became marginally faster to
outgroup faces from pre- to post-training. Training actually decreased RT to the opposite
faces than intended. It is unclear why training attention would have the opposite effect
than intended. It is possible that this is due to the change in task contingencies between
training and post-training trials. During training, the dot appeared 94.44% of the time
behind ingroup faces; however in post-training trials, this reverted to 50% of the time
behind ingroup or outgroup faces. Therefore, it is possible that participants become faster
to outgroup faces in the train ingroup condition, because these outgroup faces are
relatively more predictive of where the dot will appear during post-training compared to
the training trials. However, future studies should seek to replicate this finding.
Additionally, considering pre-training bias did not reveal a more comprehensible pattern.
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Overall, it is clear that training attention to group members was not successful. It may not
be possible to train attention to group members, because group membership is a different
type of stimulus than emotional expressions.
In addition, this study provides some evidence that neutral expressions of ingroup
members are attended to more than outgroup members. This is consistent with numerous
studies demonstrating minimal ingroups are attended to more than minimal outgroups
with methodologies ranging from face processing to eye-tracking and ERP studies
(Young & Hugenberg, 2007; van Bavel et al., 2008; Kawakami et al., 2014; Ratner &
Amodio, 2013). However, this finding is in contrast to the one other study examining
attention to minimal groups using the dot-probe methodology (Maner & Miller, 2013).
That study found greater attention to outgroup members who were rated as more
threatening. However, in this study, while outgroup faces were generally rated as more
threatening than ingroup faces, there was no relationship between attention biases and
threat ratings. Because training attention to minimal groups was not successful, the next
study examines whether attention and mimicry to minimal groups follows the same
pattern.
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Study 4
Method
Participants. One hundred and forty one undergraduate students at the University
of Denver were recruited to participate for credit in psychology classes. With an N of 141
and given the power of .80, a power analysis informs that I could detect an effect size as
big as Cohen’s f = .118. Data from 15 participants were excluded; 5 participants
incorrectly reported the group membership of other individuals and 10 participants had
less than 93% accuracy on the dot-probe trials across pre and post-training (7.4% to
22.2% inaccurate trials).
Stimuli. All stimuli are the same as the previous studies.
Design. For attention, the design consisted of three within-subject factors. The
within-subject factors were group membership (ingroup, outgroup), stimulus expression
(angry, happy, neutral), and presentation time (100ms, 500ms). For mimicry, the design
consisted of three within-subject factors. The within-subject factors were group
membership (ingroup, outgroup), stimulus expression (angry, happy, neutral), and muscle
(corrugator, zygomaticus).
Procedure. Participants completed the minimal groups manipulation and group
membership learning paradigms described in study 3. Next, participants completed the
subjective rating questions on Qualtrics. Then participants completed a dot-probe task to
assess untrained attention allocation to minimal ingroup and outgroup members. Next,
44

participants observed the photos of the minimal ingroup and outgroup members while
electromyography (EMG) was recorded to measure mimicry behavior. Finally,
participants completed the subjective rating questions a second time.
Minimal group manipulation / learning paradigm. This is the same as study 3.
Untrained attention allocation. The structure of the dot-probe trials is the same
as study 3. However, in addition to trials where faces were presented for 500ms, there
were trials where faces were presented for 100ms. There were four blocks of 54 trials
each. Emotion expression and presentation times of 500ms or 100ms were randomized
within each block. There were 108 trials for each presentation time (same as study 3).
Mimicry session. Participants were asked to report their numerical estimation
style at the start of the mimicry session. Then participants were asked to report the
numerical estimation style of the six individuals they learned about earlier. Participants
were required to repeat this until they achieved 100% accuracy reporting on the
individuals’ estimation style. Participants then viewed each individual (three ingroup,
three outgroup) displaying happy, angry and neutral expressions. First a fixation cross
was presented for 500ms. Then, faces were presented for three seconds with an inter-trial
interval of either 5000ms or 7000ms, randomly chosen for each trial. Each face was
repeated six times in a randomized order. There were a total of 108 trials. Participants
were told to closely watch the faces and to remember whether each individual was an
overestimator or underestimator. Participants were asked to report the numerical
estimation style of each individual once after viewing that individual in this session.
These reporting screens appeared after the faces disappeared from the screen and
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appeared randomly interspersed throughout the viewing session, so participants did not
know when to expect to report on numerical estimation style.
Measures
All other measures were the same as study 3.
EMG recording and processing. EMG recorded muscle activity over the
corrugator supercilii (knits brow) and zygomaticus major (raises corners of mouth).
Standard EMG site preparation and electrode placement procedures were followed
(Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Moody & McIntosh, 2011). Before electrode
placement, skin was cleansed with rubbing alcohol and gently abraded with NuPrep Gel®.
Electrodes were 4 mm Ag-AgCl, cup style electrodes and were placed approximately
1.25 cm apart center-to-center, roughly parallel to the length of the muscle. Activity over
each muscle was continuously recorded using BioPac MP150 at a sampling rate of 2000
Hz with a 10 Hz to 500 Hz band pass filter and a 60 Hz notch filter.
To analyze EMG, each continuous file was visually inspected for noise and
artifacts. EMG data was then used to calculate responses to the stimuli. The pre-stimulus
baseline window was the 500ms before stimulus onset. The response analyzed was the
activity from stimulus onset to 3000ms after stimulus onset. These data were smoothed
and rectified, and the integral under the curve was calculated. The integral values were
standardized within participant and muscle so meaningful comparisons could be made
across muscles and participants. Next the pre-stimulus activity was subtracted from the
stimulus activity to measure the change in activity caused by viewing each facial stimulus
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(i.e., to calculate the change from baseline). Each participant’s mean level of activity for
each muscle (corrugator and zygomaticus) was calculated.
Results
Minimal Groups Manipulation Check. A subjective impression composite
variable was created as in study 3 for time 1 (ingroup α = .824, outgroup α = .813) and
time 2 (ingroup α = .898, outgroup α = .883). To explore the influence of the minimal
groups manipulation, t-tests were conducted to compare ratings of individuals belonging
to the ingroup versus the outgroup. At time 1 (immediately after learning about the
groups), participants rated the ingroup more favorably than the outgroup on the
subjective impression composite variable, t(125) = -2.660, p = .009, and reported feeling
closer (on the IOS scale) to the ingroup compared to the outgroup, t(125) = 3.324, p =
.001. At time 2 (immediately after completing the mimicry session), participants rated the
ingroup more favorably than the outgroup on the subjective impression composite
variable, t(125) = -2.440, p = .016 and, reported feeling closer to the ingroup compared to
the outgroup, t(125) = 3.381, p = .001. There were no effects for threat at either time
point (p’s > .104).
Reaction Time Data Reduction. As in all previous studies, trials with incorrect
responses were removed (2.26%). Participant accuracy ranged from 93.5% to 100%.
Trials with RTs greater than 2000ms were also excluded from analyses (0.24% of trials
with correct responses). Trials with RTs 3 standard deviations (calculated separately for
each condition) above each participant’s mean were also excluded from analyses (0.39%
of remaining trials).
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Untrained Attention Bias to Minimal Groups. To test for an untrained
attentional bias to minimal ingroup versus outgroup members for the different emotional
expressions of angry, happy, or neutral faces at different presentation times, I conducted a
group (ingroup, outgroup) by emotion (angry, happy, neutral) by presentation time
(100ms, 500ms) ANOVA. There was a main effect of emotion, F(2, 246) = 6.219, p =
.002, such that participants were faster to neutral versus angry, t(123) = 3.241, p = .002,
and neutral versus happy faces, t(123) = 2.408, p = .018. There was also a main effect of
presentation time, F(1, 123) = 31.764, p < .001, such that participants were faster to
respond to probes that appeared behind faces that were presented for 500ms versus
100ms. There was also a marginal emotion by presentation time interaction, F(2, 246) =
2.481, p = .086. To break apart this interaction, follow-up t-tests indicated that for
presentation times of 500ms, participants were significantly faster to neutral versus
angry, t(123) = 3.843, p < .001, and neutral versus happy, t(123) = 2.594, p = .011, faces.
There were no other differences between emotions at 500ms (p > .344) and no
comparisons at 100ms reached significance (p > .474). There were no main effects or
interactions with group (p’s > .366). Therefore, in contrast to study 3, there was no
evidence of an attention bias to ingroup or outgroup faces in study 4.
Mimicry. I define mimicry as a significant difference between corrugator and
zygomaticus activity that matches the observed expression. Or in the case of group
differences in muscle activity, greater muscle activity to one group versus the other group
that matches the observed expression. I will also report incongruent emotional reactions
(i.e. a significant difference between corrugator and zygomaticus activity that does not
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match the observed expression. I conducted a group membership (ingroup, outgroup) by
emotion (happy, angry, neutral) by muscle (corrugator, zygomaticus) repeated measures
ANOVA. There was a main effect of muscle, F(1, 126) = 7.185 p = .008, with overall
more corrugator than zygomaticus activation. A significant emotion by muscle
interaction, F(2, 252) = 3.626, p = .028, demonstrated that muscles responded distinctly
to different stimuli. Consistent with facial mimicry, follow-up t-tests show that there was
marginally more corrugator activation to angry versus happy faces, t(129) = 1.962, p =
.052. However, there was not greater zygomaticus activation to happy versus angry faces
t(128) = -.728, p = .468.
There was a marginal group by emotion by muscle 3-way interaction, F(2, 252) =
2.342, p = .098. As planned, I examined responses to expressions separately in order to
examine the effect of each expression on the appropriate muscle. See Figure 5 for means.
Responses to angry expressions. I conducted a group membership (ingroup,
outgroup) by muscle (corrugator, zygomaticus) repeated measures ANOVA on responses
to angry expressions. There was a main effect of muscle, F(1, 126) = 8.182, p = .005,
indicating greater corrugator than zygomaticus activation. There was no main effect or
interactions with group (p’s > .769). This indicates mimicry of angry expressions that
does not differ by group membership.
Responses to happy expressions. I conducted a group membership (ingroup,
outgroup) by muscle (corrugator, zygomaticus) repeated measures ANOVA on responses
to happy expressions. There was group by muscle interaction, F(1, 126) = 7.696, p =
.006. This interaction was characterized by more zygomaticus activation to ingroup
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versus outgroup expressions, t(128) = 2.705, p = .008, with no difference in corrugator
activation between groups, t(129) = -.266, p = .791. This is indicative of relatively greater
happy mimicry to the ingroup, but not the outgroup. Another way of reporting this
interaction reveals more corrugator than zygomaticus activation in response to the
outgroup face, t(127) = 2.471, p = .015, but no significant difference between the muscles
in response to the ingroup face, t(126) = -.707, p = .481. This is indicative of an
incongruent response to outgroup happy expressions.
Responses to neutral expressions. I conducted a group membership (ingroup,
outgroup) by muscle (corrugator, zygomaticus) repeated measures ANOVA on responses
to neutral faces. There was a main effect of muscle, F(1, 126) = 8.182, p = .002,
indicating greater corrugator than zygomaticus activation. There was no main effect or
interactions with group (p’s > .110).
Mimicry to happy expressions considering attention biases. Because responses
to happy expressions were different for the ingroup versus outgroup, and because of an a
priori prediction that holding different attention biases might influence mimicry behavior,
I explored how an ingroup versus outgroup attention bias might be associated with
different patterns of happy mimicry. First, I present how attention biases at 100ms were
associated with different patterns of happy mimicry, then I present attention biases at
500ms.
Attention Bias at 100ms. For presentation time of 100ms, there were 65
participants with an ingroup attention bias and 74 participants with an outgroup attention
bias. I selected individuals with an attention bias to ingroup faces at 100ms and
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conducted a group (ingroup, outgroup) by muscle (corrugator, zygomaticus) ANOVA on
responses to happy expressions. None of the main effects were significant (p’s > .168).
As in the group overall, there was a group by muscle interaction, F(1, 59) = 4.069, p =
.048. To break apart this interaction, follow up t-tests indicate that there was greater
zygomaticus activation to ingroup versus outgroup faces, t(59) = 2.089, p = .041, but no
difference in corrugator activation. This is indicative of greater happy mimicry to ingroup
happy expressions. None of the other differences were significant (p’s > .077). See Figure
6 for means.
Then I selected individuals with an attention bias to outgroup faces at 100ms and
conducted a group (ingroup, outgroup) by muscle (corrugator, zygomaticus) ANOVA on
responses to happy expressions. None of the main effects were significant (p’s > .300).
Again, there was also a group by muscle interaction, F(1, 64) = 4.683, p = .034. In
contrast to the above findings, follow-up t-tests indicate neither zygomaticus nor
corrugator activation differed in response to ingroup or outgroup faces (p’s > .157).
However, there was greater corrugator versus zygomaticus activation to the outgroup
happy expressions, t(65) = 2.157, p = .035, but not to ingroup happy expressions (p =
.888). This demonstrates an incongruent emotional reaction to outgroup happy
expressions. Notably, there is only happy mimicry of the ingroup for those individuals
who have an ingroup attention bias, but a lack of happy mimicry and incongruent
emotional responses for those individuals who have an outgroup attention bias.
Attention Bias at 500ms. For presentation time of 500ms, there were 67
participants with an ingroup attention bias and 72 participants with an outgroup attention
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bias. I selected individuals with an attention bias to ingroup faces at 500ms and
conducted a group (ingroup, outgroup) by muscle (corrugator, zygomaticus) ANOVA on
responses to happy expressions. None of the main effects were significant (p’s > .285).
As in the group overall, there was a group by muscle interaction, F(1, 61) = 4.069, p =
.048. To break apart this interaction, follow up t-tests indicate that there was marginally
greater zygomaticus activation to ingroup versus outgroup faces, t(61) = 1.954, p = .055,
and marginally greater corrugator versus zygomaticus activity to outgroup faces, t(62) =
1.884, p = .064. This is indicative of greater happy mimicry to ingroup happy expressions
and a marginal incongruent reaction to outgroup happiness. None of the other differences
were significant (p’s > .447).
Then I selected individuals with an attention bias to outgroup faces at 500ms and
conducted a group (ingroup, outgroup) by muscle (corrugator, zygomaticus) ANOVA on
responses to happy expressions. None of the main effects were significant (p’s > .280).
Again, there was also a group by muscle interaction, F(1, 62) = 5.118, p = .027. In
contrast to the above findings, follow-up t-tests indicate neither zygomaticus nor
corrugator activation differed in response to ingroup or outgroup faces (p’s > .120).
However, there was greater corrugator versus zygomaticus activation to the outgroup
happy expressions, t(62) = 2.082, p = .041, but not to ingroup happy expressions (p =
.980). This demonstrates an incongruent emotional reaction to outgroup happy
expressions. Notably, there is only happy mimicry of the ingroup for those individuals
who have an ingroup attention bias and some incongruent reactions to outgroup

52

happiness, but a lack of happy mimicry and incongruent emotional responses for those
individuals who have an outgroup attention bias.
Discussion
This study found no attention biases to the angry, happy or neutral expressions of
minimal ingroups or outgroups at either 100ms or 500ms. Participants did mimic the
angry expressions of both the ingroup and outgroup, but this mimicry did not differ
between groups. Participants demonstrated corrugator activity in response to neutral
expressions of both the ingroup and outgroup. This may indicate negative affect during
the experiment, or this could reflect the fact that neutral faces may be interpreted as
negative expressions (Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008) and therefore elicit corrugator activation.
Finally, participants mimicked ingroup happy expressions, but frowned at outgroup
happy expressions. Importantly, individuals who showed an ingroup attention bias
demonstrated mimicry of ingroup happy expressions, whereas individuals who showed
an outgroup attention bias demonstrated the incongruent reaction of frowning to outgroup
happy expressions. This suggests that there may be individual differences in how
minimal groups are interpreted and this influences attention and mimicry behavior.
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General Discussion
The overarching goal of this project was to study the influence of minimal groups
on attention and mimicry behavior. In addition, this project also successfully replicated
some previous attention training studies and extended previous findings by showing that
attention was successfully manipulated to neutral faces depending on the degree of
attention bias pre-training. In contrast, attention training to minimal groups was not
successful and there was no reliable evidence of an attentional bias to minimal groups.
Minimal group membership influenced happy, but not angry mimicry; ingroup happy
expressions were mimicked, while outgroup happy expressions elicited a significant
frowning response. However, this mimicry response to ingroup happy expressions was
strongest in those participants who showed an ingroup attention bias. While an
incongruent frowning response to outgroup happiness was strongest in those participants
who showed an outgroup attention bias. Attention and mimicry follow the same pattern to
the ingroup. This pattern of results is most consistent with the pre-existing rapport model.
Training Attention to Emotional Faces
Study 1 replicated previous research by successfully training attention to neutral
faces. In contrast, in study 2, training attention to emotional (angry or happy) faces was
not successful even when the pre-training attention biases were taken into consideration.
The results from study 1 suggests that successful attention training is likely influenced by
the pre-existing, untrained attention bias held by participants. In study 1 post-training
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attention bias scores was dependent on the degree of bias at pre-training. Attention was
only trained away from a pre-existing bias (change the attention bias from anger to
neutral). However, in study 2, I was unable to train attention to angry or happy faces,
even when considering the attention biases held pre-training. Future research should seek
to determine whether it is more difficult to train attention to emotional faces and whether
the degree that pre-training biases influence success of attention training is only
influential for training attention to neutral faces or whether it can be influential when
attention is successfully trained to emotion faces.
Other research has suggested that a pre-existing attention bias is important; one
study successfully trained attention toward neutral faces by only enrolling children with
an attention bias toward threat (Eldar et al., 2012). Additionally, a recent meta-analysis
found that pre-training attention bias was a significant factor for attention training studies
(Mogoase, David, & Koster, 2014). However, this meta-analysis only estimated
preexistent attention biases by contrasting an experimental group with a control group.
Many attention training studies do not measure pre-training attention biases. Researchers
may assume that enrolling individuals with a clinical diagnosis of anxiety or an elevated
anxiety level is sufficient indication that these individuals hold a threat attention bias.
However, while a threat-related attention bias is reliably observed in anxious individuals
as a group-mean effect, approximately one-half of clinically anxious individuals do not
show an attention bias toward threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). In addition, some research
suggests that attention biases do not correlate with anxiety (Kappenman, Farrens, Luck,
Hajcak, & Proudfit, 2014). Future research should strongly consider the impact of
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preexisting attention biases on the success of attention training paradigms. Perhaps the
requirement of a pre-existing attention bias can explain some unsuccessful attempts at
attention training (Julian, Beard, Schmidt, Powers & Smits, 2012; Boettcher, Berger, &
Renneberg, 2012) and the existence of a publication bias (see Mogoase et al., 2014).
Additionally, the fact that attention training was successful to neutral faces, but
not emotional faces supports the idea that it may be easier to train attention to neutral
versus emotional faces, especially threatening faces. This could be because clinical
individuals are more likely to hold an attention bias to threat (MacLeod et al., 1986) and
therefore it is easier to train away from this bias. Or it could be that emotional stimuli,
especially emotional faces, are more likely to capture attention than neutral stimuli, even
for non-clinical individuals (Vuilleumier & Brosch, 2009). Angry faces, in particular,
seem especially likely to capture attention (Calvo, Avero & Lundqvist, 2006). Therefore,
it may be especially difficult to enhance an attention bias to angry faces. In fact, I only
know of one study that has successfully trained attention to angry faces (Eldar et al.,
2008), whereas other studies have been able to train attention to non-facial threat stimuli
such as threatening words (e.g. Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2009;
Harris & Menzies, 1998; MacLeod et al., 2002). Future studies should investigate how
the emotional properties of the stimulus influence the effectiveness of attention training.
Training Attention to Minimal Groups
Training attention to minimal groups was not successful. In fact, individuals in the
train to ingroup condition actually became marginally faster to outgroup faces from pre to
post training; but most importantly they did not become faster to ingroup faces. In the
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train to outgroup condition, individuals were marginally faster to the ingroup throughout
pre and post-training. In contrast to training to neutral faces where considering stronger
pre-existing angry biases made training effects stronger, pre-existing ingroup or outgroup
attention biases did not influence results. It is unclear why training attention to minimal
groups might have had the opposite effect than intended. Future work should determine if
this effect will replicate. It is also unclear why training to social groups failed. It is
possible that attention to social groups is less flexible than attention to neutral faces. Or
that there are stronger pre-existing biases to neutral compared to emotional and social
faces and it is therefore easier to manipulate emotional biases in the opposite direction.
There could be something in how individuals attend differentially to neutral faces
that makes it possible to train attention to neutral faces and not possible to train to
emotional faces or social groups. To clarify whether it is something special about neutral
faces, future research could attempt to train attention to other non-emotional stimuli, such
as shapes of different colors or train to neutral faces with specific identities, but without
group membership. These studies would clarify if attention training is possible without
emotion or if attention training for some reason requires emotional stimuli. Future
research should also investigate other methods of attempting to manipulate attention,
such as a visual search training, which is another methodology that has been used to
manipulate attention to emotional stimuli (e.g. Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004, 2009).
Untrained Attention to Minimal Groups
There was no reliable evidence for an attention bias to minimal ingroups or
outgroups. In study 3, participants demonstrated a marginal attention bias to neutral
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ingroup faces, but no attention bias to happy or angry faces. However, in study 4 there
was no evidence for any attention bias to ingroup or outgroup faces at 100ms or 500ms
for angry, happy, or neutral expressions, despite being well-powered to detect these
effects.
In studies 3 and 4 there were no overall attentional biases to minimal ingroups or
outgroups; therefore the mechanisms of threat or novelty cannot be ruled out as driving
mechanisms for attentional biases to groups. If there were an overall attention bias to
minimal groups, then this would rule out the novelty mechanism, because minimal
groups are newly created and participants never see ingroup faces more frequently than
outgroup faces (i.e. both ingroup and outgroup faces are equally novel). In neither study 3
nor 4 were threat ratings of minimal outgroup members related to attention biases. This is
in contrast to the one other dot-probe study on attention biases to minimal groups (Maner
& Miller, 2013). There were two primary differences between that study and this one.
First, the other study created minimal groups based on ostensible personality type. This
may be a stronger type of minimal group manipulation as personality type is probably
more meaningful than numerical estimation style. Second, the nature of ratings differed;
that study had participants rate how characteristic the personality trait of dangerous was
for the minimal in- and outgroup. Whereas, we had participants rate how threatening they
thought each individual was in the minimal in- and outgroup. It could be that the
difference in questions, type of minimal group, or even rating individuals versus traits
characteristic of the group changed the relationship between explicit threat ratings and
attention biases.
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While explicit ratings of threat were not related to attention biases, it is still
possible that participants’ implicit threat-associations with the outgroup could be related
to an outgroup attention bias. In fact, the mimicry findings for participants with an
outgroup attention bias provide support for this interpretation. Participants with an
outgroup attention bias expressed facial reactions consistent with a threat interpretation of
outgroup faces; they frowned to outgroup happy expressions. These findings will be
discussed in more detail below, but they provide some evidence that when participants
behave in a way consistent with a threat interpretation they show an outgroup attention
bias. This provides some support that threat may be an important mechanism driving
group attention biases.
A considerable amount of research suggests that there should be greater attention
to minimal ingroup versus outgroup members. However, there was no overwhelming
support for this attention bias in this project. The majority of this other research
supporting an ingroup attention bias uses different measures of attention (e.g. eyetracking, Kawakami et al., 2014, or facial processing, Young & Hugenberg, 2010; van
Bavel & Cunningham, 2012) that focuses on aspects of face processing. While there is
evidence that facial processing is related to attention (e.g. van Bavel & Cunningham,
2012), face processing and the dot-probe seem to measure different aspects of attention.
Attention theorists have proposed that attentional processes are multi-componential and
that these processes are independent, yet cooperate and work closely together (Posner &
Boies, 1971). The dot-probe paradigm measures selective attention, or orienting, and also
disengaging attention from one stimulus and shifting it to another stimulus (Posner &
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Peterson, 1990), while these other measures of attention related to face processing may
tap executive attention processes (Raz & Buhle, 2006). Future research could investigate
how these different aspects of attention are related to one another and related to group
differences in attention.
It is possible that we failed to find an attention bias to minimal groups, because
there were not enough perceptual differences between minimal ingroup and outgroup
faces for reliable attention biases to become apparent using the dot probe paradigm.
Anecdotally, most participants were not aware that there was always one ingroup and one
outgroup face on the screen during the group attention studies; whereas participants were
more likely to report noticing that there were different emotions on the screen during the
emotion training studies. Additionally, most of the research on group differences in
attention biases have examined racial groups, which have much more distinct visual
properties to distinguish between groups. The dot-probe studies measuring attention
biases to minimal (Maner & Miller, 2013) and incidental groups (Brosch & van Bavel,
2012) used different colored backgrounds to distinguish between the two groups,
therefore creating easily identifiable perceptual differences. However, the fact that
differences in ingroup and outgroup attention biases strengthened the group differences in
mimicry indicates that there are meaningful differences in the attention biases we
measured without using different background colors to distinguish between minimal
groups.
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Mimicry of Minimal Groups
Study 4 provides evidence for differential mimicry of happy expressions of
minimal ingroup and outgroup members; participants mimicked the happy expressions of
minimal ingroup members, while they frowned at the happy expressions of minimal
outgroup members. There were no differential mimicry effects for angry or neutral
expressions; participants displayed corrugator activation to both angry and neutral
expressions of both ingroup and outgroup members. The pattern of findings for minimal
groups is most similar to mimicry patterns of the pre-existing rapport tenet of the
affiliation model that finds enhanced mimicry of happy expressions, and equal mimicry
of angry expressions. See Table 1 for an overview of facial mimicry findings for different
types of groups and expressions.
Participants’ mimicry of happy expressions signals a desire to affiliate with
ingroup members and increase bonding and feelings of closeness. However, this
affiliation signal to the ingroup seems to be most true for those individuals who also
show an attention bias to the ingroup. Participants might signal a desire to disaffiliate
with the outgroup by not matching the happy expression, but instead frown to outgroup
happy expressions. By expressing incongruent emotional reactions like envy of outgroup
member’s happiness, participants express a desire for social distance. Previous research
has not reported incongruent reactions to happy expressions. This may be because not all
previous research has reported results in a way that captures incongruent reactions.
However, incongruent emotional reactions have been reported in interdependent groups;
there is evidence of slight happy expressions in response to outgroup’s anger (Likowski
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et al., 2011; Seibt et al., 2013). It is possible that incongruent reactions seen to outgroup
happy expressions are due to a competitive-like response to the outgroup. This
incongruent reaction, however, only exists for those individuals who demonstrate an
attention bias to the outgroup.
There appear to be differences in attention biases that correspond with differences
in mimicry behavior to minimal groups that might reveal differences in how individuals
interpret minimal groups. Approximately half of participants both attend to and mimic
the happy expressions of the ingroup; this might suggest that participants are focusing on
the motivational relevance/affiliation aspect of the minimal ingroup. However, the other
half of participants both attend to the outgroup and express incongruent reactions to
happy outgroup faces; this might suggest that these participants are instead focusing on
the threat value of the outgroup. These findings hint that threat may indeed be a
mechanism that can drive attention to the outgroup, but that pre-existing
rapport/motivational relevance may drive ingroup attention. In addition, threat or
competition may drive incongruent reactions (e.g. happy expressions in response to
competitor’s angry expressions). Emotional facial responses may be driven by separate
motivations; matching behavior may be driven by affiliation, while incongruent
emotional facial reactions may be driven by a threat or competition interpretation.
There was mimicry of angry expressions; however this mimicry did not differ
between in- and outgroups. One account of mimicry suggests that anger expressions
should not be mimicked at all because anger signals antagonism and threat (Hess, Blairy
& Kleck, 2000; Knutson, 1996) and people should only mimic emotional signals that are
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interpreted to promote affiliation goals (Hess & Fischer, 2013). However, previous
research has found greater mimicry of ingroup angry expressions for both incidental and
socially consequential groups (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Carr et al., 2014; van der Schalk
et al., 2011). Previous research may have found differential mimicry of angry
expressions because the group distinctions for both incidental and socially consequential
groups are more meaningful than minimal group distinctions and therefore these group
distinctions influence mimicry of anger expressions. Perhaps because the signal value of
minimal groups is relatively minor, but the signal value of an anger expression is
relatively strong, participants react with a negative reaction to the anger expression and
this overrides any potential minimal group differences in reactions that might exist.
It is possible that the corrugator activation seen in response to both ingroup and
outgroup anger and neutral expressions is not mimicry, but rather a negative reaction
evoked by an unpleasant stimulus (see Hess & Fischer, 2013), as corrugator activation
has been used as a measure of negative affect (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm,
1993; Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003). However, although the current research shows
that the ingroup is rated higher on subjective impression measures and other research has
shown more positive implicit attitudes to the ingroup (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001), these
attitudes towards the minimal groups do not seem to drive mimicry to angry or neutral
faces. If attitude specifically influenced facial reactions, there should have been greater
corrugator to outgroup versus ingroup faces and greater zygomaticus to ingroup versus
outgroup faces overall, particularly for neutral faces.
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Facial reactions to neutral expressions are difficult to interpret. First of all, the
concept of a neutral faces is a problematic one. There may be corrugator activation to
neutral expressions because these expressions may have been interpreted negatively and
therefore elicited corrugator activity (Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008). It is also possible that
participants were in a negative mood state during the experiment and therefore expressed
negative affect to angry or neutral expressions. However, although it is not possible to
determine why exactly there is equal corrugator activation to minimal in- and outgroups,
these findings underline that it is important to consider both how the type of expression
and type of group influence mimicry behavior.
Patterns of Attention and Mimicry in Minimal Groups
In this study, attention and mimicry to minimal groups follows the same pattern.
Participants with an attention bias to minimal ingroup faces mimic the happy expressions
of minimal ingroup members, while participants with an attention bias to minimal
outgroup faces did not match the ingroup, but displayed a frowning reaction to the happy
expressions of the outgroup.
These findings rule out the threat model of potential results that predicted
increased mimicry of the ingroup, but an outgroup attention bias. There is no evidence for
this pattern of results – that attention and mimicry follow opposite patterns. There is also
not convincing evidence in support of the goal to affiliate model that predicted mimicry
and attention would follow the same pattern of enhancement to the outgroup. While
some participants showed an outgroup attention bias, there is no evidence for enhanced
mimicry to the outgroup, even in those who have an outgroup attention bias. Attention to
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the outgroup, in this case, does not produce increased matching behavior, but rather
incongruent emotional facial reactions.
In conclusion, overall these results are consistent with the pre-existing rapport
model. Individuals mimic the ingroup more, specifically for happy expressions. It may be
that the goal to affiliate mechanism (enhanced matching to strangers or outgroups) only
drives behavior when there are no group boundaries or when, for example, the need to
belong has been directly manipulated (e.g. Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin 2008; Over &
Carpenter, 2009). Overall, attention and mimicry do follow the same pattern. Therefore,
it could be reasonable to expect that attention may play a mechanistic role for mimicry of
ingroup members. Future work will need test for a causal role of attention in matching
behavior by manipulating attention using different methods.
Implications for Studies of Intergroup Relations
To my knowledge, most studies on minimal groups have not asked participants to
rate subjective impressions of individual group members. Studies typically measure
whether a personality trait is characteristic of a group (e.g. Maner & Miller, 2013;
Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990; Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) or have participants
make spontaneous trait inferences (e.g. Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), rather than having
participants report personal feelings towards and opinions of individual group members.
In both studies 3 and 4, participants reported feeling closer to individual ingroup
members compared to individual outgroup members using the inclusion-of-other-in-self
scale. This is consistent with previous research that has suggested that a self-ingroup
connection drives findings of ingroup favoritism in minimal groups (Smith & Henry,
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1996). In addition, the differential patterns of mimicry findings for in- and outgroup
attention biases suggests there may be individual differences in how minimal groups are
perceived (see also Maner & Miller, 2012). Future research should explore what
characteristics of individuals predicts whether they will focus on the affiliative-value of
the ingroup or the threat-value of the outgroup.
Broader Implications for Society
Broadly, these findings provide evidence that even groups that differ from one
another in inconsequential ways may suffer from an intergroup bias that influences
matching behavior and subjective impressions of individual group members. In addition,
individual differences in attention biases are related to different types of matching
behavior. Matching behavior has real-world consequences, such as facilitating
interpersonal interactions and increasing feelings of closeness and bonding (Hatfield et
al., 1992; Lakin et al., 2003, van Baaren et al., 2004). Therefore, even trivial outgroups
may suffer from reduced mimicry which could lead to poorer interpersonal interactions
and reduced feelings of closeness with individual outgroup members. This could create a
feedback loop that perpetuates and exacerbates differences between groups. In addition,
those individuals who feel be threatened, even by trivial outgroups, seem especially likely
to behave in a competitive manner toward outgroup individuals. Whereas, other
individuals may be especially likely to favor the ingroup and therefore neglect the
outgroup.
There are many times in everyday life that groups are created. Short-term,
sometimes semi-competitive groups, can be formed in work-place trainings or as part of
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classroom exercises. These seemingly meaningless groups may have more influence than
expected. Forming these groups is likely to strengthen social bonds for individuals within
the group, but could have deleterious effects between groups. Therefore, it is important to
be aware of the implications when forming groups.
In addition, attention bias interventions to change attention biases to social groups
seem to be ineffective. Other intergroup bias interventions should be considered such as
the re-categorization of different groups into one common in-group; this may be a more
effective way of reducing intergroup bias (e.g. Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance,
1995; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman). In such trainings, former outgroup members
become fellow ingroup members within the created super-group and therefore receive
benefits awarded to ingroup members. Forming superordinate groups may be a more
effective way of changing behavior to outgroups, such as mimicry and subjective
impressions, rather than attention training manipulations.
Limitations
As most of these studies were conducted exclusively with undergraduate students
in psychology classes, the results may not generalize to the population as a whole. But as
the processes under investigation (attention and mimicry) are assumed to be relatively
basic psychological processes, theoretically they should operate in a similar way across
the entire population.
The dot-probe paradigm was used across four studies to measure and train
attention to emotional faces and social groups. Although the dot-probe paradigm is a
widely used tool, it has been criticized for unreliability (Schmukle, 2005; Kappenman et
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al., 2014). However, study 1 replicated and extended previous research on training
attention to neutral faces. Because training attention to neutral faces was successful, our
failure to train attention to emotional faces or minimal groups is not solely due to
properties of the dot-probe paradigm. In addition, although there was no overall attention
bias to minimal groups, ingroup and outgroup attention biases were corresponded with
different patterns of mimicry behavior, so the attention biases measured in this study
seem to be related to actual behavior.
Measuring emotional facial expressions with EMG allows for the recording of
subtle muscle movements that cannot be perceived by the naked eye (Tassinary &
Cacioppo, 1992). These emotional reactions are thought to be automatic (Dimberg et al.,
2000) and cannot be suppressed (Dimberg, Thunberg & Grunedal, 2002). However,
emotional facial reactions as measured by EMG can be influenced by a number of
different processes such as mood (Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007) and
mental effort (Waterink & Van Boxtel, 1994). While it is not possible to complete rule
out the impact of these other processes, especially on responses to angry faces, responses
to happy ingroup faces can be explained by an affiliative reaction to ingroup members’
smiles and not purely by mood or a positive affective reaction to ingroup members
overall. It is specifically ingroup membership plus smiling displays that elicit smiling
responses in observers. Therefore, both group membership and expression type matter in
producing mimicry behavior.
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Conclusions
Pre-existing attention biases may be an important factor influencing successful
training of attention to neutral faces. Attention training to social groups may not be
possible. While there is no evidence for overall attention biases to minimal groups,
ingroup and outgroup attention biases may reveal individual differences in how minimal
groups are implicitly interpreted. These attentional biases may strengthen emotional
facial reactions to minimal groups. Overall, attention and mimicry seem to follow the
same pattern to the ingroup, which is largely consistent with the pre-existing rapport
model. Future research should examine other ways to manipulate attention to social
groups and whether attention can play a mechanistic role for mimicry to ingroups. Future
research should also address other methods of increasing matching behavior to outgroups
in order to extend the beneficial social purposes that matching behavior serves to
outgroup members.
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Appendix
Table 1
Summary of Mimicry Findings of Different Expressions to Different Groups
Happy

Anger

Sadness

Fear

in = out 1, 2, 3

in > out 1, 2, 3

-

-

Interdependent

in > out 4, 5, 6

Ø 4, 5, 6, * 4, 5

in > out 4, 5, 6

-

Incidental

in = out 7, 8

in > out 8, Ø 7

in > out 7

in > out 8

Minimal

in > out 9, * 9

in = out 9

-

-

Socially
Consequential

Note. The Ø represents that no mimicry to the expression was observed. The * represents
there were incongruent emotional reactions to the expression. The – represents that there
are no data for the cell. 1Carr et al., 2014, 2Bourgeois & Hess, 2008, study 1, 3van der
Schalk et al., 2011, study 2, 4Likowski et al., 2011, 5Seibt et al., 2013, 6Weyers et al.,
2009, 7Bourgeois & Hess, 2008, study 2, 8van der Schalk et al., 2011, study 1, 9the
present study
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Figure 1. Reaction times to angry vs. neutral faces for training to neutral in Study 1.
Error bars are ±1 standard error of the mean
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 = -.832, p < .001

Figure 2. Relationship between pre-training attention bias and post-training attention bias
in Study 1. The stronger the attention bias to angry faces at pre-training, the stronger the
attention bias to neutral faces at post-training.
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Figure 3. Pre-training attention bias to emotional faces of minimal group members for
Study 3. Error bars are ±1 standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4. Reaction times to ingroup vs. outgroup faces by training condition in Study 3.
Error bars are ±1 standard error of the mean.
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Figure 5. EMG activation to ingroup and outgroup emotional faces in Study 4. Error bars
are ±1 standard error of the mean.

95

Z-scored muscle activation

EMG to Happy
Expressions for Ingroup
Attention Bias
.150

EMG to Happy Expressions for
Outgroup Attention Bias
.150
.100

.100
.050

Corr

.000

Zygo

.050
.000
-.050
-.100

Ingroup

Outgroup

Ingroup

Outgroup

-.050
-.100

Figure 6. EMG activation to happy expressions for individuals with an ingroup or
outgroup attention bias at 100ms in Study 4. Error bars are ±1 standard error of the mean.
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